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NOTES
Physician's Liability for Pre-Conception Torts
For whenever the common law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also
gives a remedy by action; and therefore, wherever a new injury is done, a
new method of remedy must be pursued.'
I. Introduction
Although in the past genetic disorders were considered an act of God,2
recent advances in the study of human reproduction and genetics have made it
increasingly possible to calculate the risk that parents will have genetically de-
formed children. Additionally, the development of techniques by which the
genetic makeup of offspring may be determined in utero and the corresponding
availability of eugenic abortions have given some couples the option to terminate
a pregnancy when the child will be genetically defective.'
These medical advances have resulted in an expanding number of lawsuits
instituted against physicians whose patients gave birth to deformed children. As
a result, a new theory of tort liability has evolved that permits recovery for torts
committed prior to the conception of a child.
Historically, an unborn child was deemed to have no inherent right under
a theory of tort to recover for injuries suffered prior to birth.4 As scientific
understanding of the human reproductive process matured, however, so also did
the law regarding the right of the unborn to recover for prenatally inflicted in-
juries. Sanctioning a cause of action to those who are injured by negligence that
occurred prior to conception is a logical step in the evolutionary development of
the tort rights of the unborn.
Pre-conception torts may be broadly classified into two categories: (1) torts
caused by an affirmative, negligent act of a physician committed against the
mother of the deformed child, denominated for purposes of this note as a "pre-
I 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 123.
2 SHAW, Genetically Defective Children: Emerging Legal Considerations, 3 AM. J.L. &
MED. 333 (1977).
3 The most widely recognized new technique for in utero determination of genetic makeup
is amniocentesis. In amniocentesis, at approximately the sixteenth week of pregnancy, a
large-bore hypodermic needle is inserted into the uterus and a few milliliters of amniotic fluid
are withdrawn. The amniotic fluid contains sloughed-off fetal cells which may then be analyzed
to determine the fetus' genetic makeup. P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, 23
(1977).
This note does not consider the question of a physician's duty to disclose genetic informa-
tion to his patients during the period of gestation. The decisions in this area are mixed. Many
cases have denied a cause of action to any plaintiff. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 392
F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
The trend, however, appears to be toward permitting a cause of action to parents who allege
that they would have terminated the pregnancy had they been properly advised. See, e.g.,
Becker v. Schwartz, No. 559 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975).
4 See, e.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884); Drobner v. Peters, 232
N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
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conception injury," and (2) those actions which are characterized by the passive
negligence of the physician, namely, failure to disclose to prospective parents the
risks of genetic deformity in their offspring. This second category may be divided
further into actions for (a) "wrongful conception" and (b) "wrongful life."
In the course of this note two recent cases, Park v. Chessins and Renslow v.
Mennonite Hospital,' which exemplify the developing trend of the law in this
area, will be examined in detail. On the basis of this discussion the note will sug-
gest where the law is or should be going and the ramifications which the ex-
pansion of this nascent doctrine will have for the legal and medical communities.
II. The Nature and Predictability of Genetic Disease
An individual's characteristics are determined in part by his unique genetic
makeup.' The genes of a human being are arranged linearly on forty-six chro-
mosomes which in turn are carried in pairs.' Twenty-two of these pairs are
autosomes; the remaining pair are the sex-linked chromosomes.' In addition to
its array of normal genes, however, every individual "carries" two to six lethal
genes and many more non-lethal genes that cause deleterious hereditary defects."
Genetic diseases are usually classified according to the number of genes in-
volved and by inheritance pattern when this is known." Genetic disorders can
5 No. 560 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978). The opinion in Park v. Chessin applied
also to a companion case, Becker v. Schwartz. Id. Becker, however, was based on a wholly
different set of facts and it is difficult to understand why the court decided them together. In
Becker, the plaintiff-mother, who was 37 years old, gave birth to a Down's syndrome child.
Unlike the Parks, she made no inquiry of her physician about possible genetic defects in the
fetus. She, nevertheless, alleged that the physician had negligently failed to disclose the risks
of Down's syndrome occurring in a fetus of any woman who conceives after age 35. Had she
been informed of the risk and understood the availability of diagnostic techniques to determine
the genetic makeup of the fetus, she would have undergone the tests and aborted, if necessary.
Although facially similar, the two cases differ in several ways: (1) the child in Becker was
conceived prior to any consultation with the physician (see text accompanying notes 68-71
infra), (2) no inquiry concerning genetic effects was made of the physician under the Becker
facts, and (3) Becker assumes that all prospective mothers over 35 should have the fetus they
carry diagnostically tested for genetic defect, A discussion of these differences, however,
extends beyond the scope of this note.
6 67 Ill.2d 348, 10 Ill. Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
7 See generally M. LEvITAN & A. MONTAGA, TExToox ON HUMAN GENETICS (1971).
Both DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) and RNA (ribonucleic acid) are linear sequences of
nucleotides (in DNA or RNA), which encode the genetic information that specifies a single
gene product. Annas & Coyne, "Fitness" for Birth and Reproduction: Legal Implications of
Genetic Screening, 9 FAM. L. Q. 463, 464 n.1 (1975). Thus, by selective gene repression and
activation the patterned array of cells that make up the tissues and organs of the human body
is constructed. Id. at 465.
8 P. REILLY, supra note 3, at 7.
9 Id. A female has two X chromosomes; a male has an X and a Y chromosome. Alter-
native forms of a particular gene are known as alleles. At every gene locus, on every pair
of chromosomes, a person may have identical alleles (homozygous) or different ones (hetero-
zygous). A gene located on either the X or Y chromosome is considered sex-linked. For reasons
not yet deciphered, it is believed that the Y chromosome, unlike the X chromosome, carries only
a few genes and that these primarily control the sexual differentiation of males. Sex-linked
disorders are caused by genes carried on the X chromosome. Id. at 10.
10 Shaw, supra note 2, at 334.
11 P. REILLY, supra note 3, at 7. The inheritance pattern is the manner in which the gene
causing a deformity is passed to the child. One example of an inheritance pattern is the
Mendelian inheritance pattern. For a discussion of inheritance patterns, see P. REILLY, supra
note 3, at 7-15.
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be broadly classified as 1. monogenic abnormalities,"2 2. polygenic or multi-
factorial diseases, 3 3. immunologic materno-fetal incompatibility, 4 and 4. gross
chromosomal aberrations." Monogenic abnormalities follow the strict Mendelian
rules of inheritance.' Most other genetic diseases do not. Thus, although the
probability of giving birth to a deformed child with a monogenic abnormality
may be calculated precisely; accurate risk estimates of the other diseases cannot
be made.
Scientists have identified more than 2,000 genetic diseases and at least 100
new genetic defects are discovered each year." It is estimated that 200,000
babies are born in America each year with genetic defects" and that at least
twelve million Americans suffer from diseases or disabilities caused, in whole or
in part, by genetic factors.'
Some gene-determined disorders have been treated successfully with tra-
ditional therapeutic methods." Treatments for other genetic maladies have
resulted from advances in the search for a way to control genetic diseases. These
therapeutic measures, however, while extending the lives of some who in the past
would have died, can do no more than alleviate the symptoms of the gene-related
disorder.2 Generally, no conventional cure for genetic disease exists. The only
effective method of controlling genetic disease is to prevent the birth of children
who otherwise would be born genetically defective.
The costs experienced by the family of a genetically deformed child far
12 B. HILTON, D. CALLAHAN, M. HARRIS, P. CONDLIFFE & B. BERKELY, ETHICAL ISSUES
IN HUMAN GENETICS, 59 (1973) [hereinafter cited as B. HILTON].
Monogenic (or single gene) abnormalities may be transmitted as autosomal dominant,
autosomal recessive, X-linked recessive or X-linked dominant traits. Id. As of 1975, more
than 2000 of these traits, not all of which are debilitating-but including such serious dis-
orders as hemophilia, Tay-Sachs disease, sickle cell anemia and Duchenne-type muscular
dystrophy-had at least been tentatively identified. Note, Father and Mother Know Best:
Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488,
1491 n.16 (1978).
13 Polygenic disorders are caused by an unknown number of largely undefined genetic
factors interacting with a similar quantity of metabolic factors. Generally, scientists are un-
aware of the etiology of most of these disorders. Middle-age ailments such as diabetes, arterio-
sclerosis and hypertension are examples of polygenic disorders. B. HILTON, supra note 12, at 59.
14 Immunologic materno-fetal incompatibility is a genetically conditioned incompatibility
between the mother and the fetus. In this condition, the fetus is adversely affected by the very
environment in which he is surrounded. Rh-disease of the newborn is an example of this type
of disorder. Id.
15 Gross chromosomal aberrations are characterized by the addition of extra genetic
material, trisomy, or the absence of needed genetic material, monosomy. The most common
example of this type of disorder is Down's syndrome, Trisomy 21. P. REILLY, supra note 3,
at 12.
16 Id. Under the Mendelian rules of inheritance if two heterozygous persons marry, there
is a 25% chance that a child of their union will be affected by the disorder for which botl!
parents are heterozygous for the abnormal allele, a 25% chance that the child will be com-
pletely normal and a 50% chance that the child, like both of its parents, will be heterozygous.
P. REILLY, supra note 3, at 9.
17 See 87 YALE L.J., supra note 12, at 1491 n.16.
18 Annas & Coyne, supra note 7, at 463.
19 Shaw, supra note 2, at 334.
20 P. REILLY, supra note 3, at 21. For example, patients with phenylketonuria (PKU),
a mentally retarding disease, suffer an inability to metabolize the amino acid, phenylalanine,
which leads to toxic accumulation in the tissues and inexorably to retardation. To treat
this disorder a special diet has been devised which reduces the intake of phenylalanine. Af-
fected persons, therefore, do not accumulate it and the retardation process is suspended. This
treatment has had dramatic success in preventing mental retardation. Id.
21 Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues,
68 Nw.U. L. REv. 696, 698 (1974).
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exceed the costs of raising a normal, healthy child. The emotional hurt and
suffering which affect every member of the nuclear family are very difficult to
quantify. Moreover, rising health care costs steadily increase the weight of the
economic burden which, either directly or indirectly, parents and siblings must
bear. Thus, genetic disease has become a national health care problem.
Screening for genetic defects was, until about 10 years ago, at best inexact.22
Predicting the occurrence of a particular genetic trait was based principally on
the history of that trait occurring in the family.23
Today, by analyzing a sample of blood, a determination whether an in-
dividual is a carrier of a gene for certain diseases can be made.24 Further, having
determined the manner by which a significant number of genetic defects are
inherited, prospective parents can be advised, in many cases prior to conception,
of the precise genetic risks attendant to conception and childbirth. 5
III. Pre-conception, Affirmative Acts of Negligence
The first category of pre-conception torts has been denominated for purposes
of this note "pre-conception injury." A "pre-conception injury" is characterized
by an affirmative negligent act committed against the mother which results in
injury to a child not yet conceived. To date, in only one case, Renslow v.
Mennonite Hospital, has such a cause of action been recognized against a
physician. Renslow, therefore, merits a detailed examination in light of the
historical genesis of the recognition of a cause of action for injuries incurred by
an unborn child.
A. Genesis of Recovery for Injuries to the Unborn
In 1884, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided Dietrich v. Inhabitants
of Northampton." In this landmark decision denying a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a prenatally injured child, Mr. Justice Holmes enunciated the
common law doctrine that a fetus was not entitled to a cause of action because
"an unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of injury .. [and] any
damage to it ... was recoverable by her...,,""
Many courts followed the rationale of Dietrich, including the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital." In Allaire, however, a
strong dissent was voiced by Justice Boggs who concluded:
The law should .. .be that whenever a child in utero is so far advanced in
prenatal age as that, should parturition by natural or artificial means occur
at such age, such child could and would live separable from the mother, and
grow into the ordinary activities of life, and is afterwards born, and becomes
22 See generally P. REILLY, supra note 3; Shaw, supra note 2; Waltz & Thigpen, supra note
21.
23 Waltz & Thigpen, supra note 21, at 700.
24 Id.
25 87 YALE L.J., supra note 12, at 1492.
26 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
27 Id. at 17, 52 Am. Rep. at 245.
28 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
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a living human being, such child has a right of action for any injuries
wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his or her person at such age of viabil-
ity, though then in the womb of the mother.2 9
Notwithstanding the dissent of Justice Boggs, the Dietrich rule was applied
for forty-six additional years. Finally, in Bonbrest v. Kotz,3 ° the District Court
for the District of Columbia, relying extensively on the theory of the Boggs
dissent, recognized a common law right of action for prenatal injuries. The
Bonbrest court ruled that an infant has a separate legal existence from its mother
at such time as it is capable of sustaining life separate from her. Thus, viability
at the time of injury became the test of an infant's right of recovery.
Another fourteen years elapsed before the viability standard was first dis-
carded. In Smith v. Brennan3 an action was brought on behalf of an infant
who was injured in utero in an auto accident at an early stage of its mother's
pregnancy. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a cause of action vests
in a prenatally injured plaintiff irrespective of the time of injury. The Smith
court reasoned that since no jurisdiction which had approved recovery for an
injury to a viable fetus had later denied recovery to a child who survived a
pre-viability injury, there was no reason to deny recovery in this case. Further
justifying this conclusion, said the court, was the practical acknowledgement
that the viability rule is impossible to apply because no one knows when viability
actually occurs.32
In Illinois, however, the viability rule remained a fixture of state law even
though it had been tempered by allowing a cause of action for the wrongful death
of a viable child injured in utero and thereafter born dead. 3 Thus, at the time
of Renslow the "viability test" of Bonbrest was still a doctrine which in Illinois
would preclude a cause of action for injuries inflicted prior to birth.
B. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital
In Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, the Illinois Supreme Court became the
first court of last resort to recognize a cause of action by an infant plaintiff
injured by the pre-conception negligence of a physician.
The mother of Leah Anne Renslow brought a cause of action for negligence
for herself, individually, and on behalf of her minor daughter. The complaint
29 Id. at 374, 56 N.E. at 642.
30 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). State courts soon followed the lead of the Bonbrest
court. See, e.g., Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334
(1949); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
31 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); accord, Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipeline Co.,
212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
32 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court's dicta indicated that viability occurs at the point
at which the fetus is capable of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. Clearly, under
this construction viability does not occur at the time of conception but at some indeterminate
time during the pregnancy. 410 U.S. 113 '(1973).
33 In Amann v. Faidy, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled Allaire which had followed
the rule derived in Dietrich. In Amann, the court held that there is a right of action for the
wrongful death of a viable child, injured in utero, who is born alive but later dies. 415 Ill. 422,
114 N.E.2d 412 (1953). Thereafter, in Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, the court extended its




alleged that in October 1965, when the mother was 13 years of age, the de-
fendant physicians on two occasions negligently transfused her with 500 ccs of Rh-
positive blood. The mother's Rh-negative blood was incompatible with and
ultimately sensitized34 by the Rh-positive blood. The plaintiff mother was un-
aware of adverse reactions from the transfusions and knew neither that she had
been improperly transfused nor that her blood had been sensitized. Defendants,
although aware of the error, at no time notified the mother or her family.
In December 1973, during the course of a routine blood screening, incident
to the plaintiffs' prenatal care, the mother's condition was discovered. The sen-
sitization of the mother's blood caused prenatal damage to the hemolytic
processes"s of the infant, necessitated induced premature birth and resulted in
the infant's affliction with hyperbilirubinemia.' Additionally, the infant suffered
from permanent damage to various organs, her brain, and her nervous system.
The trial court dismissed the infant's action because she had not been con-
ceived at the time of the alleged injury and thus her complaint failed to state a
cause of action. The appellate court, stressing the foreseeability of the injury,
reversed. The question posed to the Illinois Supreme Court was, "Does a child
not conceived at the time negligent acts were committed against its mother, have
a cause of action for its injuries resulting from [a physician's] conduct?" 7
When the Renslow appeal reached the Illinois Supreme Court, the first
question addressed was the propriety of the viability rule. Noting that this rule
had been widely criticized, the court held that viability at the time of injury is
not a prerequisite to a cause of action. Thus, under the court's holding, an injury
inflicted even at the very moment of conception gives rise to a legally cognizable
injury and a corresponding cause of action.
The Renslow facts, however, involved an injury inflicted not merely
prenatally but pre-conceptionally, as well. Thus, taking the next logical step, the
Renslow court held that a cause of action accrues to an infant plaintiff injured
by the pre-conception negligent acts of a physician.
The court's treatment of the pre-conception injury issue centered upon find-
ing a duty on the part of the physician toward the yet-to-be conceived child.
Although noting that the concept of duty is not "sacrosanct," 8 and that fore-
seeability is not its sole determinant, the Renslow court, nevertheless, concluded
that duty is the cornerstone of negligence and that foreseeability is the touchstone
34 Sensitization results from the introduction of incompatible blood into the bloodstream.
The Rh-factor foreign to the negative individual is an antigen, an element capable of con-
tributing to definite changes because of its presence. These antigens can cause the destruction
of red blood cells. 4 B R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 304.14 (3d ed. 1978).
35 Hemolysis is the alteration, dissolution, or destruction of red blood cells in such a way
that hemoglobin is liberated into the medium in which cells are suspended. Hemolysis may be
caused, for example, by specific complement-fixing antibodies, toxins, various chemical agents,
tonicity, and freezing and thawing. STEDMSAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, Fourth Unabridged
Lawyer's Edition 632 (1976) [hereinafter cited as STEDMAN'S].
36 Hyperbilirubinemia is an abnormally large amount of bilirubin in the circulating blood,
resulting in clinically apparent jaundice when the concentration is sufficient. STEDMAN'S at
668. Bilirubin is a red pigment formed from hemoglobin during normal and abnormal destruc-
tion of red corpuscles by the reticuloendothelial system. STEDMAN'S at 172.
37 67 Ill.2d at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
38 Id. at 356, 367 N.E.2d at 1254.
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of duty. Thus, although it facially acknowledged the critiques of commentators, 9
the court analyzed the situation as though duty and foreseeability were equal in
scope.
Amplifying the rights of the unborn (prenatally injured) to include a cause
of action for a pre-conception injury was easily achieved by the court. Reflecting
on the evolution of the right of recovery of an infant for prenatal injuries, includ-
ing the right to recover for a previability injury, the majority reasoned:
The cases allowing relief to an individual for injuries incurred in its previable
state make it clear that a defendant may be held liable to a person whose
existence was not apparent at the time of his act. We, therefore, find it
illogical to bar relief for an act done prior to conception where the defendant
would be liable for this same conduct had the child, unbeknownst to him,
been conceived prior to his act. We believe that there is a right to be born
free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the
child's mother.
40
The court's reasoning and conclusion are clearly proper in light of the Renslow
facts.41 The infant plaintiff in Renslow, as found by the court, was foreseeably
injured by the defendant. As the Renslow court stated, "Logic and sound policy
require a finding of legal duty . ."4 and a corresponding right of action in such
a case.
The Renslow court found support for its position in two additional cases
dealing with pre-conception torts, Park v. Chessin13 and Jorgensen v. Meade
Johnson Laboratories.4 In both cases the courts concluded that it is not necessary
that a legal duty be owed to one in existence at the time of the negligent act in
order to give rise to a cause of action.
Additionally, the Renslow court acknowledged the interdependency of
scientific advancement and common law growth. As medical techniques and
capabilities advance at a rapid pace, the common law must adapt to meet the
needs of modern society. Thus, "sound social policy,"45 said the court, mandates
39 Id. Duty, say these commentators, is the expression of the sum total of policy con-
siderations which lead the law to say a plaintiff is entitled to protection. Id.
40 Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
41 The absurdity of denying a cause of action for pre-conception injury while permitting
one for a prenatal injury is best illustrated by the following example. Assume that Mrs. R. is
21 years old and in need of a transfusion. Her blood is Rh-negative. It can be proved that
Mrs. R. and her husband conceived a baby girl on the previous night. Mrs. R.'s doctor
negligently transfuses her with Rh-positive blood. As a result of the transfusion, prenatal
damage to the infant is incurred. A cause of action for injuries arises in favor of the child in
this example. If, however, Mr. and Mrs. R. conceived the child after the negligent transfusion,
in the past a cause of action would have been denied, notwithstanding the fact that the very
same injuries were suffered.
42 67 Ill. 2d at 359, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
43 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), afi'd, No. 560 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed
Dec. 27, 1978) (reversed in part on the issue of a cause of action for "wrongful life"). See
text accompanying notes 77-94 infra.
44 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). In Jorgensen, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant
drug company negligently manufactured birth control pills. The plaintiff took the pills for
several months, stopped, became pregnant, and gave birth to Down's syndrome twins. The
complaint alleged that the pills had altered the chromosome structure of the wife and that, as
a result, a Down's syndrome deformity was created within the fetuses.
45 67 Ill. 2d at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
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the recognition of a cause of action for the infant injured by the pre-conception
negligence of a physician.
The defendants objected that the court's holding would impose perpetual
liability upon the negligent physician. The court weakly parried, asserting
that the future courts in their judicial wisdom would draw the limit between
compensable and noncompensable injuries. The court, however, rather than
espousing a general rule of potentially unlimited liability based on the Renslow
facts, might have suggested boundaries to limit its holding.
C. Limiting the Renslow Holding
When a plaintiff is injured by a genetic defect which is removed by more
than one generation from the negligent act, the proximate cause might still be
the physician's negligence.' Foreseeability attributable to the physician, how-
ever, is reduced significantly. Foreseeability is not per se a mathematical con-
cept. One cannot simply deduce a statistical computation of what is or is not
foreseeable. Thus, if the court's holding is to be limited, as it necessarily must
to avoid indefinite liability, an arbitrary line must be drawn.
A reasonable limitation of the cause of action for "pre-conception injury"
would be to bar recovery to all generations except that immediately following
the generation which was the subject of the negligence. This limitation, although
arbitrary, has the benefit of permitting a cause of action to the most likely
victim of the negligence while containing physician liability to acceptable levels.
Although the law has long recognized that not all injuries are compensable,
in cases such as pre-conception injury "where a party's negligence is directly
[and foreseeably] responsible for physical injury to another, there is no question
that the injured party may [and should] recover . . ."" The Renslow court
determined only that a cause of action arises on behalf of the infant for a
"pre-conception injury." To recover, the infant like any other litigant must
bear the burden of establishing the elements of a traditional tort action, namely
duty, breach, proximate cause, and injury.
In Renslow, the only issue appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court was
the dismissal of the child's cause of action. Thus, the court did not address
the questions (1) whether the parents have a cause of action against the phy-
sician for the financial injury caused as a result of the child being deformed
and (2) whether a cause of action exists for mental suffering and emotional
trauma. The following discussion answers both of these questions in the affirma-
tive when a physician has negligently failed to disclose genetic information to
prospective parents. In the more egregious instance of an affirmative act of
46 The defendants in Renslow, according to the court, raised "the specter of successive
generations of plaintiffs complaining against a single defendant for harm caused by genetic
damage done to an ancestor in a nuclear accident." 65 Ill. 2d at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
The court claimed that the damage done by defendant's act would not be self-perpetuating as
nuclear accidents are. If, however, the only sure way to control the occurrence of genetic
defects is to avoid conception, then genetic defects which result from a physician's affirmative
negligence will in fact be self-perpetuating. See generally P. REILLY, supra note 3.




negligence, as previously discussed, a similar right of recovery should exist.
Scientific advancements have made it possible today to advise parents
of the genetic risks attendant to bearing a child before conception occurs. This
note now addresses the liability of a physician for another pre-conception tort,
failure to disclose genetic information.
IV. Failure to Disclose: Negligent Omission Is Also Tortious
A. Wrongful Conception
1. Definition
The term "wrongful conception" has been defined by some as a cause
of action for the unplanned birth of a normal, healthy child caused by a negli-
gent sterilization.48 For the purposes of this note, however, "wrongful con-
ception" will also refer to the occasion when the physician negligently conveys
or fails to disclose genetic information critical to a parent's decision whether to
conceive a child.
As noted previously, the only absolute way to avoid the occurrence of in-
curable genetic disease in a child is to prevent the birth of such a child. 9 For
prospective parents, especially those who have already experienced the trauma
of giving birth to genetically defective offspring, accurate genetic risk information
is a necessity if they are to make an informed decision whether to conceive a
child. Prospective parents attempting to exercise their constitutionally pro-
tected right" to determine whether to conceive a child have neither the means
nor the requisite knowledge to garner this information on their own."1 Thus,
it is the duty of the expert, the physician, to furnish the needed genetic infor-
mation.
Failure to fulfill this duty by negligently conveying or failing to disclose
genetic information increasingly results in suits against the physician after a
genetically deformed child is born, particularly when, had the parents been in-
formed of the inherent risks, they would not have conceived a child. The stage
48 No. 560, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
49 P. REILLY, supra note 3, at 22.
50 Recent constitutional developments have raised the right to choose not to procreate to
the level of a constitutionally protected right. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down a law limiting the advertisement and sale of contraceptives);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (sustaining the limited right of an individual to elective
abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognition of contraception as an in-
dividual right).
51 The risk of a genetic defect occurring in a. child must be detected, if at all, by medical
experts. Generally, however, prospective parents rely on private physicians as their first and
sole source of genetic knowledge. 87 YALE L.J., supra note 12. The modern general practitioner
or "family doctor" cannot possibly know all of the increasingly sophisticated scope of medical
knowledge regarding genetics. B. HILTON, supra note 12, at 28. Physicians, however, are
required to remain abreast of recent developments especially those within their field of ex-
pertise. Moreover, the standard of due care for physicians may require in certain circumstances
that the prudent and careful practitioner consult with other medical practitioners. A. HOLDER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 49 (1978). Clearly, in an area as volatile as genetics, the gen-
eral practitioner, when faced with a couple seeking genetic counselling prior to making a




for these legal battles has been set by the convergence of three factors: (1) the
physician's accurate, elaborate, and growing arsenal of detecting persons who
are "at risk" for developing or transmitting genetic diseases,52 (2) prospective
parents' newly awakened awareness of their legal right to avoid conceiving a
child,"3 and (3) the overwhelming increase in medical malpractice suits and
related litigation. 4
2. The "Wrongful Conception" Cause of Action
In cases of "wrongful conception" the courts have had little difficulty in
finding that the physician, by virtue of the doctor-patient relationship, has a
duty to the parents of the deformed child. The physician is obligated to stay
abreast of new developments in his field and to diagnose the diseases and injuries
of the patient with due care. Thus, in the instance of prospective parents, the
physician has a duty to advise them of their genetic fitness for giving birth.
Causation, while slightly more troublesome, has in some cases been routinely
disposed of by the court's acceptance of the plaintiff-parents' allegation that
but for the physician's failure to properly advise them, the child would not
have been born.57 Other courts, however, rather than assuming causation, have
reasoned to the same conclusion by analyzing the key facts which characterize
every "wrongful conception" case.5
In Custodia v. Bauer,"9 the defendants maintained that, rather than a
negligent sterilization, the intervening sexual acts of the plaintiffs were the
proximate cause of the subsequent unplanned birth. Discarding this argument,
the California appellate court noted that to find causation it is only necessary
52 A. MILUNSKY & G. ANNAS, GENETICS AND THE LAW 139 (1976).
53 See note 50 supra.
54 The incidence of medical malpractice cases in this country rises steadily each year. Dif-
ferent states, however, vary in the number of malpractice claims filed. Two reasons help to
explain these differences: (1) where medicine is still practiced on a "small town" basis there
is a much more personal and continuing relationship between the physician and patient, and
(2) in a small city there is a much more personal relationship between the attorneys and
physicians. Attorneys, therefore, are more reluctant to bring suit. A. HOLDER, supra note 51,
at 398-99.
55 See, e.g., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187
N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -- , 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn.
1977); Karlson v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). For cases denying a cause of action for "wrongful
conception," see, e.g., Lapointe v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976). Coleman v.
Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital, 35
App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970) appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 805, 264 N.E.2d 354,
315 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1971); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 927 (1974).
56 A. HOLDER, supra note 51, at 52.
57 See, e.g., 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Park v. Chessin, No. 560 (N.Y.
Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
58 See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Betan-
court v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); cf. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App.
Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 265 (1974) (diagnosing pregnancy in time to permit termination).
59 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). In Custodio, plaintiff brought an
action to recover medical expenses, damages for pain, and suffering and the cost of raising an un-
wanted but normal child which resulted from a negligent sterilization of the plaintiff-mother.
The court held that the parents were entitled to bring an action. In so doing, it noted, "On
the ... record it is clear that if successful on the issue of liability they have established a right
to more than nominal damages." Id. at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
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that "the negligence in question be a proximate cause of the injury . . .""
not the sole cause and that it would be "difficult to conceive how the very
act the consequences of which the operation was designed to forestall can be
considered unforeseeable."'" The application of this principle to a negligent
failure tc! disclose genetic information is axiomatic. Although courts readily
have found duty, breach, and causation in cases of wrongful conception, damages
is an area of uncertainty and controversy.
The principal contention of those who advocate denial of a cause of action
for "wrongful conception" is that even if one accepts the fact that the physician
was negligent, it is impossible to measure the damages. Thus, damages cannot
be justly awarded and no cause of action should exist. This basic proposition was
espoused in Gleitman u. Cosgrove.2
In Gleitman, the plaintiff, who was two months pregnant, was examined
by the defendant. She informed the doctor that one month earlier she had had
an illness diagnosed as rubella." Mrs. Gleitman inquired about the possible
effect of the disease on the unborn child and was told that there would be no
effect. Thereafter, Mrs. Gleitman gave birth to a baby with substantial defects
in sight, hearing, and speech. In their complaint the plaintiffs alleged that had
they been properly advised by defendant they would have terminated the
pregnancy.
In denying the Gleitmans' cause of action, the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted that tort damages are compensatory. The measure of such damages is the
difference between the condition in which the plaintiff would have been had
the defendant not acted negligently, and plaintiff's impaired condition as a result
of the negligence. The court stated, however, that to determine compensatory
-damages it
would have to evaluate the denial to the [parents] of the intangible, im-
measurable, and complex human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood
and weigh these against the alleged emotional and money injuries ....
When the parents say their child should not have been born, they make
it impossible for a court to measure their damages in being the mother
and father of a defective child.
6 4
60 Id. at 316, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (quoting Griffith v. Oak Ridge Oil Co., 190 Cal. 389,
393, 212 P. 913, 914 (1923)).
61 Id. at 316-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
62 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
63 Rubella is more commonly known as German or three-day measles. It is an acute
exanthematous disease caused by an RNA virus, and marked by enlargement of lymph nodes,
but usually, with little fever or constitutional reaction. When rubella occurs during the first
several months of fetal life there is a high instance of infant abnormalities such as retardation.
STEDMAN'S, supra note 35, at 1243. Viruses, such as those causing rubella, however, are only
a few of the environmental agents that can cause serious harm to the developing fetus. 87 YALE
L.J., supra note 12, at 1488n.2.
64 49 N.J. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693. The Gleitman court assumes that a healthy child
always confers an overriding benefit. Many courts which have permitted a cause of action for
"wrongful conception" have invoked the "benefit rule." See, e.g., 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344
A.2d 336 (1975); 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977). The Restatement of Torts
declares: "Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which
was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, where
this is equitable." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939).
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Thus, the court concluded that since the birth of a child confers an overriding
emotional benefit on the parents and since it is impossible to calculate damages
based on the nonlife of a person, the parents' complaint was properly dismissed
by the lower court.
In sharp contrast to the Gleitman court, the Supreme Court of the United
States has explained the theory of damages in the following way:
The general rule is, that all damages resulting necessarily and im-
mediately and directly from the breach are recoverable, and not those that
are contingent and uncertain. The latter description embraces, as I think,
such only as are not the certain result of the breach, and does not embrace
such as are the certain result, but uncertain in amount.
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment
of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fun-
damental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and
thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such
case, while the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or
guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as
a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only ap-
proximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be
measured with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the
case, which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise.
65
Thus, difficulty in determining the amount of damages is an insufficient basis
to deny a cause of action to parents for "wrongful conception."
In Jacobs v. Theimer,6' a case factually similar to Gleitman, the Texas
Supreme Court also dispelled the damages theory of the Gleitman court. The
Jacobs court concluded that the economic burden which is related solely to
the physical defects of the child is free from the objection that damages cannot
be calculated. The extraordinary expenses of raising a deformed child, said the
court, are precisely the type of damages which courts are accustomed to determin-
ing in personal injury actions.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in another rubella case, reached the same
conclusion in Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital." The Dumer court concluded
that the attending physician had a duty to inform the prospective mother of
the probable effects of rubella upon the fetus. When the physician has breached
this duty the court said that a cause of action accrues to the parents of the de-
formed child for all damages which they have reasonably and necessarily
suffered as a result of the child's defect.
The most recent case of "wrongful conception" is Park v. Chessin.6s In
Park, the plaintiff, Hetty Park, gave birth in June 1969, to a baby who was
afflicted with polycystic kidney disease, 9 a fatal hereditary disease of such a
65 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
66 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
67 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
68 No. 560 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
69 Polycystic kidney disease is characterized by numerous cysts (of varying sizes) scattered
diffusely throughout the kidneys, sometimes resulting in organs that tend to resemble grapelike
clusters of cysts. The disease is congenital, may be transmitted by either parent, and probably
represents the result of a dominant gene. STEDMAN'S, supra note 35, at 745.
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nature that there exists a substantial probability that any future baby of the
same parents will be born with it. Concerned with a reoccurrence of this
disease, the Parks consulted the defendants, obstetricians who treated Mrs. Park
during her first pregnancy, to determine the likelihood of reoccurrence.
In the complaint the Parks alleged that defendants responded to their in-
quiry with the medically inaccurate advice that the chances of having any future
baby with the disease were "practically nil"7 ° because the disease is not heredi-
tary. Thereafter, in reliance on defendants' advice, the Parks made a conscious
choice to conceive another child. The plaintiff-parent became pregnant and
in July 1970, gave birth to a child, Lara, who also suffered from polycystic
kidney disease. Unlike the first child, however, Lara survived for two and one-
half years before succumbing to the disease.
Alleging that had they been correctly advised of the true risk of reoccurrence
of the disease, they would not have chosen to conceive, the parents brought a
cause of action on their own behalf and on behalf of the infant for "wrongful
life." Plaintiff-parents' complaint sought damages for, among other things,
the expense borne by them for the care and treatment of the child.
Relying on Jacobs and Dumer, the Park court readily allowed that the
damages alleged by the plaintiff-parents were ascertainable and that the
parents stated a cause of action in their own right. That right, said the court, is
predicated upon a breach of duty owed to the parents themselves, resulting in
damage for which compensation may readily be fixed.
Unlike the sterilization cases, in cases such as Park in which the parents
made a conscious decision to conceive, no injury would result if the child were
born normal.71 When, however, the parents would not have conceived a child
had they been given accurate genetic information, they are economically in-
jured when forced to bear the burden of raising a deformed child. Once it has
been determined that an injury has been incurred, the difficulty of estimating
damages does not warrant the total dismissal of the cause of action.
Like the Jacobs court, however, the New York Court of Appeals limited
the extend to which plaintiff-parents could recover to the sum expended for
the extraordinary care and treatment of the child necessitated by the physical
deformity. Thus, a final question, unrelated to whether a cause of action exists,
is whether the Park court's limitation is a proper measure of damages.
In Park, the parents alleged that had they been properly advised they would
not have had the child. Therefore, the proper measure of damages would
seemingly be the total cost of raising the child and not the extraordinary expenses
of raising a deformed child.
Actions for the total cost of raising a child generally have arisen in cases
70 No. 560, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
71 The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for
injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1299 (1956). Compensation is intended to repair plaintiff's injury or make him whole
as nearly as that may be done with an award of money. The remedy should be commensurate
to the injury sustained. Id. at 1301.
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of negligent sterilization.72 Few courts, however, have recognized any cause
of action when a normal, healthy child was born73 and those courts which have,
generally, limited recovery by invoking the "benefit rule." 4 As previously noted,
in Park, had the child been born normal, no injury would have been incurred and
as a result no cause of action would have accrued. Thus, the Park court may
have reasoned that since the parents would have been uninjured by the birth
of a normal child, the extent of their injury by having a deformed child is not
the financial difference between having no child and a deformed child, but
rather, the difference between having a healthy child and a deformed child.
Such a rationale, however, denies the simple facts of the case, that had the
parents been properly advised, no child would have been born and, therefore,
no costs would have been incurred.
Alternatively, the court may have applied the "benefit rule" to reach the
published result. It may have determined that the joy and happiness that even
a deformed child brings to its parents will offset the normal costs of rearing a
child. Thus, the only compensation necessary to reinstate the parents in the
position in which they would have been but for the negligence, is the extraor-
dinary costs of rearing. Such reasoning, however, assumes that any child born
necessarily brings happiness into the life of its parents. As the Custodia court
said, however, there is a trend of change in social ethics with respect to the family
establishment so that "the birth of a child may be something less than [a]
blessed event ....
A more likely, if not more logical, reason for the court's limitation of the
right of recovery is simply that it wished to limit the physician's liability. The
court, according to some commentators, 7 was taking a quantum leap forward in
the law of torts. Thus, to mitigate the impact of its decision, the court, in effect,
invoked its equitable powers to determine to what extent the parents were
equitably entitled relief. The net result of the court's unexplained limitation is
to grant a legal cause of action to the injured party but to deny that party full
compensation for his injury. This denial of compensation for a direct injury
applies also to damages for emotional and mental injury. A discussion of the
cause of action for mental injury appears later in this note.
Notwithstanding the court's arbitrary restriction on recovery, the Park
decision represents another step in the direction of protecting the rights of those
who are injured by the pre-conception negligence of a physician.
B. Wrongful Life
In addition to seeking relief in their own right, the parents in Park also
72 See, e.g., 409 F.Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976); 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967); 349 A.2d 8 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.
2d 496 (1976); 496 S.W.2d 124 '(Tex. Civ. App. 1973). Cf. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.
2d 511 (1971 (pharmacist negligently filled birth control pill prescription).
73 See, e.g., 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344
A.2d 336 (1975). Cf. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (pharmacist negligently filled
birth control pill prescription).
74 See note 64 supra.
75 251 Cal. App. at 321, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
76 See, e.g., Altman, Birth Defect Suits Worry Doctors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1979, § C at 1.
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brought an action on behalf of the physically deformed infant for "wrongful life."
Although the cause of action for "wrongful life" has been defined in various
ways 7 7 generally it is understood to refer to cases in which an infant-plaintiff
seeks to recover for having been wrongfully brought into the world 7' because,
due to his deformity, life is one of constant travail. Thus, the plaintiff in these
cases alleges that he would have been better off not living and that he is entitled
to damages for being born.
A cause of action for "wrongful life" has generally been denied by courts
which have addressed the issue.79 This action, unlike those for "pre-conception
injury" and "wrongful conception" is imbued with logical inconsistencies and
conflicting policy considerations. As the court in Park forewarned,
Even as a pure question of law, unencumbered by unresolved issues of fact,
weighing of the validity of a cause of action seeking compensation for the
wrongful causation of life itself casts an almost Orwellian shadow premised as
it is upon concepts of genetic predictability once foreign to the evolutionary
process. It borders on the absurdly obvious to observe that resolution of this
question transcends the mechanical application of legal principles.
8 0
Courts refusing to recognize the "wrongful life" action generally rely on three
propositions for such refusal: ( 1 ) it does not fit into any legal concept with which
the court is experienced, (2) damages are impossible to calculate, and (3) there
is no cognizable legal injury.8"
Some commentators, disputing the assertion that "wrongful life" does not
fit into any traditional legal theory, have suggested that the cause of action be
recognized precisely because it meets all the traditional elements of recovery in
tort.8 2 Without addressing for the moment the question whether all traditional
elements are satisfied, the courts' first reason for denying "wrongful life" recovery
warrants further discussion.
As noted previously, parents, injured by the negligent transmission of
medical information, have been allowed a cause of action for receiving the ex-
traordinary expense of raising a deformed child.8 This right arose where one ap-
parently had not existed previously because of the close interplay between the
77 See, e.g., Park v. Chessin, No. 560 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978). The Park
court viewed the term "wrongful life" as "a broad umbrella under which plaintiffs alleging
factually divergent wrongs have sought judicial recognition of their claims." No. 560, Slip op.
at 6 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
78 See, e.g., 49 N.J. 22, 227. A.2d 689 (1967).
79 Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975): 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d
689 (1967); Park v. Chessin, No. 560 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978); Johnson v.
Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 134, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977); 57 App. Div. 2d
73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 App. Div. 2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966,
appeal denied, 37 N.Y.2d 707, 337 N.E.2d 618 (1975); 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502
(1970); 27 N.Y.2d 805, 264 N.E.2d 354, 315 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1971); 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975). The foregoing omits those cases by illegitimate children for "wrongful
life" since these cases are beyond the scope of the present discussion.
80 No. 560, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
81 See, e.g., 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); 57
App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977).
82 See, e.g., Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic Counselling: A Dissent to the
"Wrongful Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581 (1973); Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing:
Wrongful Life, 31 MIAMI L. REV. 1409 (1977); Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life":
[A Suggested Analysis], 55 MsNN. L. REv. 58 (1970).
83 See text accompanying notes 48-76 supra.
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maturation of scientific theories of genetics and legal theory. Thus, it would be
inconsistent to deny an action on behalf of an infant who is born genetically
deformed solely because the theory of "wrongful life" is not encompassed within
a recognized tort classification, such as wrongful death. A denial of recovery
should not be based on such faulty reasoning. To condemn this approach is not
to say, however, that "wrongful life" actions should be permitted. To the con-
trary, the two additional reasons present solid and substantive objections to the
cause of action and form a sufficient foundation for a reasoned denial of a
"wrongful life" cause of action.
The weaker of the two arguments is that in a "wrongful life" action the
precise calculation of damages is impossible. As demonstrated previously, this
position becomes less tenable by simple comparison with recovery for intangible
damages such as pain and suffering, damages which courts regularly compute.
In the instance of "wrongful life," however, this reason is more creditable and
merits further analysis.
The measure of damages in tort law is compensatory.8 4 Damages are limited
to that remuneration which is necessary to restore the individual to the place he
would have occupied were it not for the negligence." When an infant-plaintiff
claims that he should not have been born at all, no base line exists from which
to appraise the damages. No manner exists in which to determine the place the
plaintiff would have occupied but for the negligence.
A cause of action for "wrongful life," said the Paik court, "demands a cal-
culation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson's choice
of life in an impaired state and nonexistence.""0 Although one commentator has
postulated a measure of the value of damages where nonlife is preferred, 7 in fact,
man-who knows nothing of death or nothingness-is incapable of placing a
value on the supposed benefit of nonbeing s and thus establishing the requisite
base line from which damages can be appraised.
The most compelling reason for denial of a cause of action for wrongful
life is the absence of a legally cognizable injury. Unlike parental recovery of the
extraordinary expenses of raising a deformed child, the infant in a "wrongful
life" case can show neither a commission nor an omission on the part of the
physician which would have reduced the likelihood of being harmed, i.e., being
born.
Although a cardinal principle of tort law is that a person who is injured
by the negligence of another should be recompensed, it is unclear in cases of
"wrongful life" that life with deformities as compared to nonlife constitutes an
injury.89 The court in Park treated this issue extensively. Reversing the Appellate
84 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 71, at 1299.
85 Id. at 1301. See note 71 supra.
86 No. 560, slip op. at 10 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
87 55 MINN. L. REv., supra note 72, at 62-67.
88 49 N.J. 22, 63, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (1967) (Weintraub, J. dissenting in part).
89 One commentator has expressed the rationale which courts have relied upon in denying
the existence of a cognizable legal injury in this way: "no comparison [between life in a de-
formed body and nonlife] is possible since were it not for the act of birth the infant would not
exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff cuts from under himself the ground upon which he
needs to rely in order to prove his damage." Tedeschi, "On Tort Liability for 'Wrongful Life,"
1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513, 529 (1966).
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Division which had recognized "the fundamental right of a child to be born as
a whole, functional human being,"9 the New York high court concluded that
"whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been born with
gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and
theologians."
91
Unable to discern any value in nothingness, the Park court, emphasizing
the high value traditionally placed on human life by law and society92 assumed
an inherent overriding value of any life over the "utter void of nonexistence."93
Thus, since no injury cognizable at law has occurred, a requisite element for a
cause of action in tort is lost and the Park court, like many others, properly dis-
missed the "wrongful life" cause of action.94
V. Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress
Although granting a right of recovery for the extraordinary expenses of
treatment for a deformed child, the Park court denied a cause of action for the
emotional injury and mental suffering of the parents. Relying on Howard v.
Lecher,95 the court concluded that recovery for such damages must necessarily be
circumscribed.
The court's denial of a cause of action for emotional injury is predicated
almost wholly on a policy decision to limit the liability which a physician may
incur for giving negligent genetic advice. No other reason could explain the
artificial reasoning that the court applied to reach its decision.
Quoting Howard, the Park court observed that to permit recovery would
"inevitably [lead] to the drawing of artificial and arbitrary boundaries."9 The
court attempted to distinguish Johnson v. State9 7 by positing that any injury in-
curred by the Parks was indirect. The court continued by arguing that although
the parents of a deformed infant suffer anguish which only parents can endure,
that anguish is nevertheless offset by the love parents experience. Thus, the
90 60 App. Div. 2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
91 No. 560, slip op. at 9 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
92 See, e.g., 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975);
But cf. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (birth of a child may be less than a
blessed event); 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (birth of a child not always an
overriding benefit).
93 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
94- It is important to distinguish between a "pre-conception injury" and a "wrongful life"
action. A "pre-conception injury" is the result of an affirmative act of negligence on the part
of the physician which adversely affects the mother's genetic makeup and is in turn transmitted
to the injured party at conception. This gives rise to a conditional prospective liability. Renslow
v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 10 Ill. Dec. 484, 367 N.W.2d 1250 (1977). A "wrongful
life" action is based on the negligent failure of the physician to provide the parents with
necessary genetic information. Unlike "pre-conception injury," damages are not clearly defined
nor can the infant show that the physician's negligence caused the genetic defects of which he
complains. See text accompanying notes 77-93 supra.
95 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). In Howard, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant, aware that plaintiffs were East European Jews, negligently failed
to advise them that the fetus might suffer from Tay-Sachs disease. The question before the
court of appeals, however, was only whether the parents were entitled to recover for the alleged
trauma caused by the birth, degeneration and death of their child.
96 42 N.Y. 2d at 113, 366 N.E.2d at 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
97 37 N.Y. 2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). In Johnson plaintiff
daughter was the recipient of an incorrect notice that her mother had died. The court allowed
recovery of damages for emotional distress.
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court retreated to the very argument, namely, the incalculability of damages,
that it was forced to ignore in reaching its decision to allow the cause of action
for economic harm. Moreover, the Park court stated that the "calculation of
damages for plaintiff's emotional injuries remains too speculative to permit re-
covery notwithstanding the breach of a duty flowing from defendants to them-
selves.""8 By relying on this rationale, the court undercut its prior reasoning that
recovery is barred by the indirectness of the injury.
The Park court addressed the issue of emotional distress and mental suffering
only in the context of a parental action for "wrongful conception." Arguably,
in this posture one could assume the "mere bystander" rationale applied to the
parents of Howard"9 and conclude that the injury to the parents was indirect and
therefore noncompensable. In Renslow, however, such an argument could not
be advanced because the child was unquestionably directly injured. Thus, the
infant, in the absence of some other valid judicial reason, would be entitled to
recover for the mental suffering incurred by reason of his deformity.
From the Park court's arguments, clearly the denial of the cause of action
for mental suffering and emotional distress is premised on policy considerations.
Principal among these concerns is a fear of overextending recovery to others than
those directly involved. This fear, however, is without basis because the recovery
involved is, in fact, by those who have been directly injured.""0 The mental
anguish suffered by parents of a deformed child, and in a Renslow situation, by
the child himself, is a direct injury flowing from the defendant's breach of duty
and the consequent liability of the physician is therefore constrained.
Moreover, to argue that the calculation of damages is speculative is to ignore
the reality that courts have traditionally determined compensation for pain and
suffering and other amorphous injuries. "Surely a judicial system that daily
evaluates such matters as pain and suffering, which have admittedly 'no known
dimensions, mathematical or financial' should be able to evaluate the harm which
proximately"' 1 results from a breach of duty.
Although few courts have recognized a cause of action for mental suffering
and emotional distress in "wrongful conception" cases the denial of this right is
unfounded. Damages for emotional injury have been recognized in a variety of
torts and the courts which have refused to grant a cause of action for them in
cases of wrongful conception have yet to identify any unique problems in genetic
cases that do not occur elsewhere. It may therefore be expected that once the
Park decision is accepted by other state judiciaries, the logical extension to ac-
ceptance of a cause of action for mental suffering will soon follow.
98 No. 560, slip op. at 13 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
99 The Howard court reasoned that the parents were made to bear no physical or mental
injury other than the anguish of observing their child suffer. Thus, the court concluded the
parents were mere bystanders and are not entitled to a cause of action for mental distress unless
they can establish a direct injury to themselves.
100 See 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977). Decided two weeks prior to
Howard, Karlson sustained a cause of action for damages for mental suffering. The Howard
decision is nevertheless controlling.
101 49 N.J. at 50, 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs, J. dissenting) (quoting Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J.
82, 95, 138 A.2d 713, 720 (1958)).
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VI. Mitigation of Damages
When a determination of negligence and attendant liability has been made,
one further issue must be resolved. Before damages may be assessed it must be
decided to what extent the plaintiff is required to mitigate damages. For example,
in Park, the plaintiff-parents claimed that they would not have conceived the
child were it not for the negligent advice of the defendant. In order to recover,
should they have been required to terminate the pregnancy when it was dis-
covered that the child would be genetically defective?
The problem of mitigation of damages was discussed at length in Troppi v.
Scarf."2 Troppi involved an action brought by the parents of an unplanned,
healthy child against a pharmacist who negligently filled a birth control pill
prescription. The parents sought to recover the expenses of raising the child to
maturity but the defendant countered by asserting that the parents should have
mitigated the damages by either aborting the fetus or placing the child for
adoption.
The court discarded the defendant's contention noting that the doctrine
which requires an injured plaintiff to minimize the financial consequences of
defendant's negligence requires only that reasonable measures be taken. Thus,
the majority held that while reasonableness of mitigation is normally a question
of fact, as a matter of law no mother could reasonably be requested to abort in
order to mitigate damages.1"3 The court reinforced its holding in dictum stating,
The law has long recognized the desirability of permitting a child to be
reared by his natural parents .... If the negligence of a tortfeasor results
in conception of a child by a woman whose emotional and mental makeup
is inconsistent with . . . placing the child for adoption . . . then . . . the
tortfeasor takes the injured party as he finds him. ... "'
Thus, when the foregoing is combined with the general policy favoring life
over nonlife, no prospective mother should be required to abort a fetus in order
to mitigate the losses of a negligent physician.
VII. Conclusion
In recent years, the body of law surrounding the rights of the unborn and
their parents to recover for the negligence of a physician that results in genetic
deformity has developed rapidly. The recent decisions of two state high courts,
Park v. Chessin0 2 and Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,"° ' are a forward-looking
step in the growth of the common law in an area which is inextricably tied to ad-
vances in scientific knowledge and technology. The Renslow decision makes clear
102 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
103 Id. at 260, 187 N.W.2d at 520. Accord, - Minn. - , 260 N.W. 2d 169 (1977);
45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974). The Park court declined to treat the issue of
mitigation stating that particular elements of expense or loss should await resolution at the
trial level.
104 31 Mich. App. at 259, 187 N.W.2d at 520.
105 No. 560 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
106 67 Il1. 2d 348, 10 Ill. Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
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that the time at which an affirmative act of negligence is committed is of no con-
sequence to the determination of whether a cause of action exists in both the
parents and the child. A physician has a duty to both the prospective parent and
the yet-to-be conceived child. Any affirmative breach of that duty which results
in injury to the child is compensable and will give rise to a cause of action on
behalf of the child.
The child's cause of action, however, must arise out of an affirmative act
of negligence by the physician. The situation must be such that were it not for
the defendant's negligence the child would have been born without any genetic
defects. Thus, "wrongful life" actions continue to be precluded. On the strength
of precedent, if a cause of action is to be recognized for "wrongful life," clearly
it must, as suggested by the Park court, await legislative sanction.0 7
Finally, a cause of action for extraordinary expenses has been recognized on
behalf of the parents of a deformed child conceived as the result of the negligent
withholding of genetic information by a physician. This conclusion, while laud-
able, is just the first step in the recognition of the rights of parents to be accurately
informed before making the decision whether to conceive. Cases in the near
future will certainly take the next short step and permit a cause of action for all
damages which are the direct result of the physician's negligence, including
mental suffering.
It may be anticipated that in the future an increasing number of state courts
will recognize "pre-conception injuries" and "wrongful conception" as establish-
ing causes of action. Arguments against such recognition might stress increased
economic burden on patients as a result of additional diagnostic testing and
malpractice insurance premiums. These excuses, however, are made by physicians
who seek to escape responsibility for their professional behavior which inalter-
ably injures the lives of their patients. The skillful practitioner should have no
fear. He will find no greater liability imposed by recognition of a cause of action
for pre-conception torts than he now bears for setting a broken leg.
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed 0 8
Timothy J. Carey
107 No. 560, slip op. at 10 (N.Y. Ct. App., filed Dec. 27, 1978).
108 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
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